Theory and History of Ontology

by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

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  • "History Logic" and "Bibliographia" are my other websites. "Table of Contents" gives the list of the pages, for other indexes see the "Sitemap". "Modern Ontologists" contains a table with links to the pages on the most important philosophers of the 19th and 20th centuries who have written on ontology. The "Search" function can be used to find a particular author or subject.

 

Parmenides of Elea. Annotated Bibliography: S - Z

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Sainati, Vittorio. 1965. "Tra Parmenide E Protagora (Le Premesse Storiche Della Logica Greca)." Filosofia no. 16:49-110.

  2. Sanders, K.R. 2002. "Much Ado About 'Nothing': Meden and to Me Eon in Parmenides." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 35:87-104.

    "It has been a universally accepted assumption among commentators on Parmenides that mêden, "nothing," and to mê eon, "what-is-not," are for him synonymous. This paper focuses primarily on the role this supposed semantic equivalence plays in arguments supporting a popular emendation in fragment B8.12. After a brief survey of the principal difficulties in interpreting this and the surrounding lines and a review of the reasons traditionally proffered in support of the emendation, the author argues that the best sense for Parmenides' arguments results by retaining the manuscript reading and recognizing the fundamental difference in meaning between "nothing" and "what-is-not"."

  3. Santillana, Giorgio de. 1970. "Prologue to Parmenides." In Reflections of Men and Ideas, 82-119. Cambridge: M.I.T. University Press.

    Originally published in Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, First Series 1961-1965 - Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.

    "Proposes a new interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy, an interpretation which is free from the misconceptions and superimpositions of ancient commentators and modern scholars, and which avoids the error of seeing in his philosophical system an ontological or metaphysical construction, or a logico-linguistic exercise. Insists on integrating the details of Parmenides' cosmology and astronomy with the principles developed in the first section of his poem. Concludes that the originality of Parmenides' thought, as well as his most significant contribution to the development of ideas, should be recognized in the fact that he "made of geometry the core of reality in an entirely different way from his predecessors" (p. 119): Parmenidean Being reveals itself as "three-dimensional extension pure and absolute" (ibid.), which was conceived as the ultimate substratum of all things." [N.]

  4. Sasso, Gennaro. 1988. "L'esegesi Parmenidea Di Guido Calogero." La Cultura no. 26:189-285.

  5. Schlüter, Jochen. 1979. Heidegger Und Parmenides. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag.

    Ein Beitrag zu Heideggers Parmenidesauslegung und zur Vorsokratiker-Forschung, zur Formung des parmenideischen Prooimions (28B1)

  6. Schmitz, Hermann. 1988. Der Ursprung Des Gegenstandes. Bonn: Bouvier.

  7. Schofield, Malcolm. 1970. "Did Parmenides Discover Eternity?" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie:113-135.

  8. ———. 1987. "Coxon's Parmenides." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 32:349-359.

  9. Schürmann, Reiner. 1988. "Le Différend Hénologique. La Loi De L'un, Et La Loi Des Contraires." Parola del Passato no. 43:397-419.

    Translated in English as: The law of the One and the law of contraries in Parmenides in: Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal vol. 13, 1, 1988, pp. 3-20

  10. ———. 2003. Broken Hegemonies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Translated by Reginald Lilly from the French: Des Hégémonies brisées, Mauvenzin, Trans Europe Repress, 1996.

    See Part One: In the Name of the One. The Greek Hegemonic Fantasm. I: Its Institution: The One That Holds Together (Parmenides) pp. 51-135

  11. Schwabl, Hans. 1953. "Sein Und Doxa Bei Parmenides." Wiener Studien no. 66:50-75.

    Reprinted in: H. G. Gadamer (ed.) - Um die Begriffswelt der Vorsokratiker - Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968, pp. 391-422.

    "Discusses the relationship between the realm of Being and the world of opinion in the philosophy of Parmenides. Emphasizes the fact that even though the sensible world stands in radical opposition to Being, both are ultimately the complementary polarities of one philosophical vision which remains coherent and consistent within itself. Offers comments on the impact of Milesian and Pythagorean ideas on the formation of Parmenidean thought."

  12. ———. 1956. "Parmenides Forschungsbericht 1939-1955." Anzeiger für die Altertumswissenschaft no. 9:129-156.

  13. ———. 1963. "Hesiod Und Parmenides: Zur Formung Des Parmenideischen Prooimions (28b1)." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie no. 106:134-142.

  14. ———. 1972. "Parmenides Forschungsbericht 1957-1971." Anzeiger für die Altertumswissenschaft no. 25:15-43.

  15. Scuto, Giuseppe. 2005. Parmenides' Weg. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

    Vom Wahr-Scheinenden zum Wahr-Seienden: mit einer Untersuchung zur Beziehung des parmenideischen zum indischen Denken

  16. Sedley, David. 1999. "Parmenides and Melissus." In The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophers, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 113-133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  17. Sellmer, Sven. 1998. Argumentationsstrukturen Bei Parmenide: Zur Methode Des Lehrgedichts Und Ihren Grundlagen. New York: Peter Lang.

  18. Sider, David. 1985. "Textual Notes on Parmenides' Poem." Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie no. 113:362-366.

  19. Skirry, Justin. 2001. "The Numerical Monist Interpretation of Parmenides." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 39:403-417.

    "The doctrine of numerical monism as it is traditionally attributed to Parmenides is the claim that there is only one thing that is genuinely or truly real; that is, is not generated, not perishable, immutable, indivisible, whole, complete and continuous. In this paper, I argue that this interpretation is mistaken, because it entails a claim that Parmenides does not accept, namely that Being and not-Being are both the same and not the same. I conclude that numerical monism is not a doctrine that should be attributed to Parmenides, and that it should be rejected in favor of some alternative interpretation."

  20. Solana, José. 2003. "Generación Y Tiempo En El Poema De Parménides." Méthexis.International Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 16:7-22.

    "The object of this paper is to analyze the questions related to two ontological predicates of the eon, ungenerated and imperishable, and the proof for them developed along B8.5-21. The article tries to demonstrate that, to refute the generation and corruption, it is not enough to resort on non-Being. It is necessary also to exclude the time, because the time introduces the difference and, supposed the difference, the generation is possible. Denied the possibility of the difference, the generation would be possible only introducing the non-Being."

  21. Solmsen, Friedrich. 1977. "Light from Aristotle's Physics on the Text of Parmenides B 8 D-K." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 22:10-12.

    "Endeavors to elucidate the precise meaning of Parmenides' Frag. 8, in which it is categorically affirmed that neither can anything come from nothing, nor can something come from something, and that, consequently, there is no becoming. Appeals to Aristotle's Physics 191a23-33, a passage which it regards as referring specifically to Parmenides." [N.]

  22. Somville, Pierre. 1976. Parménide D'elée: Son Temps Et Le Nôtre. Un Chapitre D'histoire Des Idées. Paris: Vrin.

  23. Spangler, G.A. 1979. "Aristotle's Criticism of Parmenides in Physics I." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 13:92-103.

    "Discusses Aristotle's account and critique of Parmenidean philosophy in Physics 184bff, specifically his rejection of monism and Parmenides' rejection of the reality of motion. Observes that in developing his own position, Aristotle was still willing to accept the Parmenidean principle that what is cannot originate from what is not." [N.]

  24. Sprague, Rosamond Kent. 1955. "Parmenides: A Suggested Rearrangement of Fragments in the 'Way of Truth'." Classical Philology no. 50:124-126.

    "Suggests that Frag 7.1 should be placed after Frag. 6.2 and Frag 7.3 after Frag. 6.9. Notes that Frag. 7.2 is only a variation of Frag. 6.3" [N.]

  25. Stannard, Jerry. 1960. "Parmenidean Logic." Philosophical Review no. 69:526-533.

    "Criticizes the ordinary interpretation of Parmenides' Frag. 5, and maintains that every attempt to elucidate the doctrines of Parmenides must take into account the logical structure on which they rest. Reviews various endeavors to clarify the precise sense of those doctrines, noting that in each case their sense depends on the meaning attached to what is meant by 'logic'. Observes in its conclusion that "Parmenides was involved in a philosophical activity whose center lay in the attempt to supply reasons for his catalogue of the characteristics of Being" (p. 533)." [N.]

  26. Stein, Howard. 1969. "Comments on 'the Thesis of Parmenides'." Review of Metaphysics no. 22:725-734.

    About the paper by Charles Kahn (1969).

    "I want to suggest that the conclusions of your beautiful paper on the Greek verb "to be," which you apply in what seems to me a very convincing way to the analysis of Parmenides, can be exploited further than you have done, with a gain of coherence for the doctrine. I offer my suggestions diffidently: they are rather speculative, and I have no scholarship in the language and little in the period.

    The principal question I want to raise is that of the interpretation of what you call Parmenides' "wildly paradoxical conclusions about the impossibility of plurality and change." An argument that leads to a truly paradoxical conclusion is always open (if it escapes conviction for fallacy) to construction as a reductio ad absurdum. And the (meager) biographical tradition represents Parmenides - quite unlike Heraclitus, Heraclitus, for instance - as a reasonable and even practically effective man, not at all a fanatic. It therefore seems natural to ask, if he maintained a paradoxical doctrine, whether it did not possess for him (and perhaps for his successors who took him seriously) an interpretation that made some sense. Further, setting aside this not very weighty prima facie argument, I think the search for plausible interpretations is worthwhile in any case: for (1) to make a rational assessment of the historical evidence one needs the widest possible survey of hypotheses to choose among; (2) since conclusions in such matters are always uncertain, a list of possibilities may retain a kind of permanent (not just heuristic) value, as the best we can do; and (3) readings which are even dismissed as unsound on adequate critical grounds may still be of interest, both for the understanding of historical influence - I have in mind in the present case especially Parmenides' influence on Plato-and for our own philosophical edification.

    Now, accepting your explication of Parmenides' words, his conclusion about change can be formulated as: "what is does not change"; or: "what can be known does not change"; or: "truth does not change." But the third formulation isn't paradoxical: I think it's what we ordinarily suppose about truth; it is certainly what conventional logic presupposes; and when a sentence like "It is now six seconds past three o'clock" is used as an example of "now true, now false," it is this that seems a paradox - or a sophistry, based upon a continual change of the sentence's meaning, rather than a change of truth-value of any one meaning. To express this construction of Parmenides' thesis of unity and immutability in the "formal mode," but somewhat picturesquely, we may imagine a Book of the World, or Bible, in which everything true is written ( Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist): anyone, anywhere, at any time, may consult this book; and what he finds will always be the same (there is no supplementary year-book: all years are included in the main work).

    Of course this notion becomes entangled in the whole cluster of traditional questions about necessity or determinism versus freedom or accident or spontaneity or emergence-strengthening Parmenides' claim to be the initiator of metaphysics. But what I'm mainly concerned to emphasize is that his position on these issues is not at all clearly more paradoxical than the contrary position. I have argued elsewhere against the claim that the theory of relativity requires a Parmenidean view of "changeless Being"; but it is undeniable that this theory-and equally, for that matter, classical physics-lends itself naturally to such a view. Quantum physics, on the other hand, seems in a certain sense to be anti-Parmenidean (namely, to involve a notion of truth as essentially changing) ; and this is one of the most paradoxical aspects of the subject, which I think is far from having been fully appreciated from a philosophical point of view."

    These remarks are a revised verssion of comments made in correspondence concerning an earlier redaction of Kahn's paper. It has seemed, on the whole, least stilted to retain the informality of second person address. I wish to record my gratitude to Kahn for suggesting that these comments be published with his paper.

  27. Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin. 2001. "The Way of Truth. Parmenides' Seminal Reflections on Logic, Semantics and Methodology of Science." In Audiator Vox Sapientiae. Studia Grammatica, edited by Féry, Caroline and Sternefeld, Wolfgang, 450-472. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

    The volume is a Festschrift for Arnim von Stechow.

  28. ———. 2003. "Plato and Parmenides on Ideal Truth, Invariant Meaning, and Participation." In Ideal and Culture of Knowledge in Plato. Akten Der Iv. Tagung Der Karl-Und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung Vom 1-3 September 2000 in Frankfurt, edited by Wolfgang, Detel, Becker, Alexander and Scholz, Peter, 115-132. Stuttgart: F. Steiner.

  29. Stemich, Martina. 2008. Parmenides' Einübung in Die Seinserkenntnis. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

  30. Stevens, Annick. 1990. Posterité De L'être. Simplicius Interprète De Parménide. Bruxelles: Ousia.

    Tabe des matières: Introduction 5; Chapitre I: L'Alétheia 11; Chapitre II: La Doxa 53; Conclusion 80; Appendice: Traduction 83; Bibliographie 143; Index des Fragments de Parménide cités par Simplicius 147.

    "La plupart des fragments que nous connaissons de Parménide nous sont parvenus par l'intermédiaire de Simplicius, philosophe néoplatonicien du Vlème siècle de notre ère, grâce aux multiples citations et références étayant son commentaire à la Physique et au De Caelo d'Aristote. Or, ce commentateur ne s'est pas contenté de citer, mais a apporté bien des explications aux apories suscitées depuis vingt-cinq siècles par l'obscurité du poème parménidien. En effet, le contexte dans lequel apparaissent les citations permet souvent de situer plus exactement leur objet, et par là leur signification précise.

    (...)

    Par conséquent, mon travail suppose une connaissance préalable des doctrines platonicienne et néoplatonicienne, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la notion de l'Un dans son rapport avec l'être. Bien que j'aborde le problème au chapitre 1,B, cependant, j'évite de concentrer mon étude sur ces théories, au risque de perdre l'essentiel. Je ne fournirai pas davantage un travail exhaustif sur la pensée parménidienne, quoique, pour des raisons de clarté, j'étudierai et comparerai, sur les points les plus controversés, les explications de plusieurs interprètes modernes, en vue de proposer, quand cela est possible, mon propre point de vue. A ce propos, je voudrais signaler qu'il existe deux études récentes traitant spécifiquement de l'exégèse de Simplicius; il s'agit de "Simplicius as a source for and an interpreter of Parmenides" de Bruce M. Perry, et de "The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius" de Karl Bormann. On peut leur faire le reproche commun d'être davantage des paraphrases que des tentatives d'explication, et de ne pas exploiter ce nouveau champ herméneutique, cette richesse nouvelle d'interprétations possibles, que nous ouvre la lecture de Simplicius pour celle de Parménide. Néanmoins, la dissertation doctorale de Perry a le mérite d'exposer le commentaire de façon très systématique, paragraphe par paragraphe, en l'accompagnant d'index, de remarques philologiques, d'une bonne critique des sources et des manuscrits, et de nombreuses références aux commentateurs antérieurs qui ont pu influencer Simplicius. Quant à l'article de Bormann, s'il relève certains passages où le néoplatonicien sort de l'aporie les interprétations traditionnelles sur quelques conceptions obscures de Parménide, il n'en donne aucun commentaire ni ne cherche à voir ce qui motive l'interprète, d'où s'inspire sa conception de l'Étant, et dans quelle mesure elle déforme celle de l'Éléate lui-même.

    (...)

    J'espère avoir montré, par ces quelques observations, qu'une étude attentive de Simplicius n'est ni superflue ni aisée.

    Mon intention étant de suivre les questions posées comme essentielles par Simplicius lui-même, je n'envisagerai que les fragments transmis grâce à lui, laissant de côté une partie importante du poème. Le fait de suivre le commentaire m'oblige également à voyager constamment d'une page à l'autre en faisant bon nombre de comparaisons, d'anticipations et de rappels, ce dont le lecteur voudra bien m'excuser, puisque Simplicius, suivant lui-même l'ordre de œuvre d'Aristote, et passant, selon le besoin, d'un Présocratique à l'autre, présente une explication tout à fait disparate et en rien systématique. Néanmoins, j'essaierai de structurer mon étude de la manière la plus claire possible, envisageant, selon la méthode classique, chacune des deux parties du poème, divisées elles-mêmes en questions principales.

    Une traduction des passages de Simplicius concernant la pensée éléatique figure en appendice; j'invite le lecteur à la consulter fréquemment, car elle sert de support à tous mes développements.

    Enfin, ce travail étant achevé en 1988, je n'ai pas tenu compte des études qui ont paru à partir de cette date." (Introduction, pp. 5-9)

  31. Stewart, Donald. 1980. "Contradiction and the Ways of Truth and Seeming." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 14:1-14.

    "Studies the ways in which Parmenides and Heraclitus dealt with the issue of contradiction, specifically Heraclitus' acceptance of the meaningfulness of contradictory statements and Parmenides' categorical rejection of them. Maintains that their approaches and solutions to this issue are fundamentally flawed by their failure to develop a cogent ontology of individuation, that is, a theory of forms and substances." [N.]

  32. Stewart, Robert Scott. 1985. "Say No More: The Relationship between Parmenides' Ways of Truth and Seeming." Eidos.Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy no. 4:167-186.

    "Examines the relationship between Parmenides' Way of Truth and Way of Opinion, as well as between the two fundamental concepts which underlie the two parts of this treatise. Reviews various modern attempts to clarify their relationship, and argues that they must inevitably fail as long as they ignore the literary and historical frame of reference in which Parmenides composed his poem. Contends that the needs and capabilities of his readers compelled Parmenides to appeal to the medium of epic poetry, and that the literary conventions of that medium explain why the Way of Opinion was added as a second part of the poem." [N.]

  33. Stokes, Michael C. 1971. One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy. Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies.

    Reprint: Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.

    Preface V-VI; Contents: I. Aristotle and the Analysis of Unity and Plurality 1; II. The Milesians 24; III. Xenophanes 66; IV. Heraclitus 86; V. Parmenides and Melissus 109; VI. Empedocles 153; VII: Zeno of Elea 175; VIII. One-Many Problem in Atomism 218; IX. Miscellaneous Presocratic Contexts 237; X. Conclusion 249; Appendix: Parmenides B8.7-12 253; Abbreviations 258; Bibliography 259; Notes 267; Index of Passages 341; General Index 347-355.

    On Parmenides see pp. 109-148.

  34. Stough, Charlotte. 1968. "Parmenides Way of Truth B8, 12-13." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 13:91-107.

    "Suggests that the text of Parmenides' Frag. 8, lines 12-13, should be left intact, and that the idea manifested here, namely, that "thus it must Be absolutefy, or not at all" (an idea which negates all sorts of becoming), is expressed in a complete way and is logically well refated to the rest of the fragment." [N.]

  35. Swindler, James Kenneth. 1980. "Parmenides' Paradox. Negative Reference and Negative Existentials." Review of Metaphysics no. 33:727-744.

    "This paper presents a survey of the Russellian, Strawsonian, and Donnellanian solutions to the paradox of referring to what does not exist, Parmenides' paradox, and criticizes these for commitment to uninstantiated properties as the referents of general terms. The paper then shows that this difficulty is avoided by Plato's solution (in the Sophist), which rests on the definition of nonbeing as difference. Plato's solution preserves the referential function of subjects in negative existentials, it avoids uninstantiated properties, and it avoids all equivocal concepts of being."

  36. Tallis, Raymond. 2007. The Enduring Significance of Parmenides. Unthinkable Thought. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.

    Contents: Autobiographical Prelude IX; Preface: The once and future philosopher XII-XVI; Chapter 1. The strange dawn of Western thought 1; Chapter 2. The existence of What-Is-Not 27; Chapter 3. Propositional awareness encounters itself 50; Chapter 4. Why Parmenides happened 88; Chapter 5. Parmenides' footnotes: Plato and Aristotle 130; Chapter 6. Parmenides today 158; Works cited 189; Notes 195; Index 230-240.

    "In Chapter 2, I shall examine Parmenides' central claim - that what-is-not is not - and discuss how what-is-not comes to have such a pervasive presence in the human world. The key to this, I shall argue, is possibility - which may or may not be actualized, as a result of which what-is exists explicitly and corresponds to `truth', and what-is-not can be individuated and be an explicit falsehood. Chapter 3 looks further into the origin of negation and possibility, finding it in the Propositional Awareness (knowledge, thought and discourse) that characterizes distinctively human consciousness. Parmenides' poem, I shall argue, is the first fully fledged encounter of Propositional Awareness with itself. Chapter 4 examines in what sense Parmenides was unique among the Presocratic thinkers and then why he and, indeed, Presocratic thought arose when they did. It is obvious that philosophy must have had non-philosophical origins. I try to dig deeper than the usual explanations and in doing so examine many factors - politics, trade, exile, the alphabet, different linguistic codes - that made seventh-century Greeks conscious of their consciousness in a way that had no precedent in the hundreds of thousands of years of human consciousness prior to this. Parmenides may be seen as the resultant of the factors that led to Presocratic thought plus his reaction to his predecessors. Chapter 5 examines the most important response to Parmenides - Plato's Parmenides - which did more than any other post-Parmenidean event to amplify Parmenides' influence kind, at the same time, to conceal him behind the Platonic ideas he is supposed to have provoked. I examine not only Plato's response to Parmenides but also Aristotle's response to Plato.

    In the final chapter, I look at the possible meaning that Parmenides might have today. His present relevance resides in the fact that we may have reached the end of the cognitive road upon which he, pre-eminent amongst the early Greek philosophers, set mankind. Parmenides dismissed ordinary wakefulness as if it were a kind of sleep, in the hope of goading us to another kind of wakefulness. While the present book cannot match that ambition, I would very much hope that, by returning to the philosophical and historical hinterland of Parmenides' cataclysmic idea, I might start the process by which we return to the place from which Parmenides set out and journey in another direction in a world unimaginably different from his." pp. 25-26

  37. Tarán, Leonardo. 1965. Parmenides. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    A text with translation, commentary and critical essays.

    Contents: Foreword VII; List of bibliographical abbreviations X-XIV; Part I: Parmenides' life 1; Fragments I-XIX: Text, translations, and commentary 7; Part II: Critical essays 173; Chapter One: Parmenides' concept of Being 175; Chapter Two: Aletheia and Doxa 202; Chapter Three: The world of appearance described in the Doxa 231; Chapter Four: Parmenides in the ancient philosophical tradition 269; Appendix I 296; Appendix II 299; Index 303-314.

    "Parmenides' doctrine represents a turning-point in Greek philosophy, one that can truly be said to determine the course of Greek thought until the time of Aristotle. Not only Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists but also Plato and Aristotle tried to answer the dilemma put forward by Parmenides, namely, that since any difference from Being is absolute non-Being, and as such unthinkable, no account of the world of difference and change can be valid. But this doctrine not only invalidates any explanation of the sensible world, it asserts that this world insofar as it is different from Being is non-existent. Because it seems of fundamental importance for the understanding of Greek philosophy to determine exactly what Parmenides thought, I decided to study all available evidence about his work. My decision was based on the conviction that only such a study can be of value today, for Parmenides' philosophy is one in which all is in all and any interpretation of part of it risks, by not taking into consideration other aspects of his thought, being contradicted by the results of another partial study.

    I have devoted the first part of the book to a line by line commentary on the fragments. I have edited the text only to facilitate reference and to complete in part the critical apparatus given by Diels-Kranz. I have made use of the best available editions of the ancient authors who quote Parmenides' text. A fresh study of the manuscripts of Simplicius' commentaries to Aristotle's Physics and De Caelo may still add to our knowledge, but I am convinced that even such a study would not drastically change the status of the text of Parmenides. The variant readings given in the critical apparatus and sometimes in the commentary are selective and are especially meant to illustrate the places where a variant reading may be of importance for the interpretation of the text.

    The translation has no pretension to literary value and has been added as a complement to the commentary, to reduce as much as possible the number of ambiguities in the construction of the Greek. Each fragment is followed by its commentary, but in a few places discussion of the text is postponed till the second part of the book to preserve the unity of the first three chapters. These chapters deal with more general aspects of Parmenides' thought: his notion of Being, the relation of Aletheia to Doxa, and the content of the second part of the poem. The fourth chapter attempts to determine what the ancients took Parmenides' philosophy to be and what value this testimony has for the historical reconstruction of Parmenides' thought." (From the Foreword)

  38. ———. 1967. "Proclus in Parm. 1152.33 (Cousin) and Parmenides 28 B 3 (Diels-Kranz)." Classical Philology no. 62:194-195.

    Reprinted in L. Tarán - Collected papers (1962-1999) - Leiden, Brill, 2001, pp. 623-624.

    "Takes issue with the objection raised by J. Mansfeld ( Die Offenbarung des Parmenides, Assen, 1964, pp. 69, 73, and 79ff.) concerning the failure in the Diels-Kranz edition of the fragments of the Presocratics to mention Proclus In Parm 1152.33 as a source for Parmenides' Frag. 3. Suggests that Proclus' passage should be viewed more as a paraphrase of parts of Parmenides' Frag. 8 rather than as an imperfect quotation of Frag. 3." [N.]

  39. ———. 1977. "Concerning a New Interpretation of Parmenides." Gnomon no. 49:651-666.

    Critical review of A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (1970).

    Reprinted in: L. Tarán, Collected Papers (1962-1999), Leiden, Brill, 2001, pp. 171-192.

  40. ———. 1979. "Perpetual Duration and Atemporal Eternity in Parmenides and Plato." Monist no. 62:43-53.

    Reprinted in L. Tarán, Collected Papers (1962-1999), Leiden, Brill, 2001, pp. 204-217.

    "The purpose of this paper is less ambitious than its title might suggest, since it does not deal with everything that Plato has said on time and on eternity. Rather, it attempts to clarify some issues which have arisen in the controversy as to whether Parmenides or Plato was the first Western philosopher to grasp the notion of atemporal eternity. It is particularly concerned with some publications on the subject that have appeared within the last twelve years or so. G.E.L. Owen, in a paper published in this journal, has defended his earlier interpretation that Parmenides discovered the notion of atemporal eternity. (1) J. Whittaker for his part has contended that both Parmenides and Plato failed to grasp it, and would ascribe its discovery to some later thinker. (2) Yet another scholar, G. Reale, (3) believes that there is no essential difference between the position of Parmenides as reconstructed by Owen and others and that of Melissus. For Reale maintains that Melissus' formula "it is and always was and always will be" does not exclude atemporality, that it means the same thing as the alleged tenseless "is" predicated of Parmenicles' Being.

    Most scholars, however, do agree -- and rightly so, I believe -- that in the Timaeus Plato has clearly grasped the notion of atemporal eternity. It is therefore best to begin the discussion with him, since it will then become apparent what an ancient philosopher meant by atemporal eternity and by the tenseless "is" that expresses it." pp. 43-44

    (1) "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," The Monist 50 (1966), pp. 317-40. For references to earlier scholars who have defended this interpretation cf. my Parmenides (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), p. 175, n. 1.

    (2) "The 'Eternity' of the Platonic Forms," Phronesis 13, (1968), 131-44 and God Time Being (Oslo 1970, Symbolae Osloenses. Fasc. Supplet. 23.

    (3) Melisso. Testimonianze e frammenti (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1970), PP. 45-59, esp. 56-57 and 58-59.

    (4) Cf. Melissus 30 B 2. The fragments of the presocratics are cited from H. Diels-W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951-52).

  41. Tarrant, Harold. 1983. "The Conclusion of Parmenides' Poem." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 17:73-84.

    "The paper explores the possibility that Parmenides concluded his Poem with a final coda after B19, perhaps including B4, B16, and Cornford's fragment, all of which relate being to appearances. Doubts are cast on the authenticity of B1.31-32 and B5, and on the text at B8.54. This enables a new interpretation of the "doxa" to be given."

  42. Tegtmeier, Erwin. 1996. "Meixner Über Parmenides (Zu Uwe Meixner: Parmenides Und Die Logik Der Existenz) "Grazer Philosophische Studien" 47, (1994)." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 51:253-257.

    "Meixner argues that Parmenides' refutation of becoming is logically defective, that the term "being" occurs in two senses in his inference, synonymously with "actual" and in a wider sense. This interpretation is rejected. In addition, it is pointed out that Meixner's concepts of actuality and potentiality are not relevant referring to facts rather than to things. Finally, Meixner's disproof of what he calls "actualism" is refuted. "

  43. ———. 1997. Zeit Und Existenz: Parmenideische Meditationen. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

  44. ———. 1999. "Parmenides' Problem of Becoming and Its Solution." Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy no. 2:51-65.

  45. Tejera, Victorino. 1997. Rewriting the History of Ancient Greek Philosophy. Westport: Greenwood Press.

    See Chapter 3: Parmenides pp. 37-62

  46. Thanassas, Panagiotis. 2005. "Doxa Revisitata." In Frühgriechisches Denken, edited by Georg, Rechenauer, 270-289. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

  47. ———. 2006. "How Many Doxai Are There in Parmenides?" Rhizai.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 3:199-218.

    "Against the traditional interpretation of Doxa as intrinsically and thoroughly deceiving and untrustworthy, the present essay examines the passages which follow the self-characterization of the goddess' speech as 'deceitful'. The traits of an extensive cosmogony and cosmology open up the possibility for discerning (at least) two aspects of Doxa: first, a presentation of mortal erroneous opinions, but then also their correction within the framework of the 'appropriate world-arrangement' presented by the goddess."

  48. ———. 2008. Parmenides, Cosmos, and Being. A Philosophical Interpretation. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

    Contents: Acknowledgments 6; 1. The Poem and its legacy 9; 2. The Heart of Truth 23; 3. Esti, Being and Thinking 31; 4. The signs of Being 43; 5. Doxa: mixture vs. partition 61; 6. Aletheia and Doxa: the human and the divine 77; Appendix: translation of the Fragments 89; Selected bibliography 99: Index of names 107; Index topics 109.

  49. Thom, Paul. 1986. "A Lesniewskian Reading of Ancient Ontology: Parmenides to Democritus." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 7:155-166.

    "Parmenides formulated a formal ontology, to which various additions and alternatives were proposed by Melissus, Gorgias, Leucippus and Democritus. These systems are here interpreted as modifications of a minimal Lesniewskian Ontology."

  50. ———. 1999. "The Principle of Non-Contradiction in Early Greek Philosophy." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 32:153-170.

  51. ———. 2002. "On the Pervasiveness of Being." In Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 293-301. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    "The pervasiveness of being is the thesis that everything is. Parmenides accepted this thesis (using the verb 'is' in a special sense). By contrast, Gorgias maintained that nothing is. Plato (in the

    Sophist and the Parmenides) argued that while in a certain sense everything is, in another sense everything is-not, so that both Being and Not-being are pervasive. Aristotle argued, in contradistinction to all of the above, that neither Being nor Not-being is pervasive: some things are and some things are not."

  52. Torgerson, Tobias Peter. 2006. "The Eidos Phos and the Traditional Dichotomy of Divine and Mortal Epistemology." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 24:25-43.

    Studies what sets the eidos phos apart from other mortals in Parmenides, granting him access to divine knowledge. By comparing and contrasting Parmenides with his predecessors, we can perceive an original element in his adaptation of the dichotomy of mortal and divine epistemology: there is a type of human being, the eidos phos, whose mental perception (noos) not only liberates him from the deceptive opinions of mortals but also renders him able to verify the words of the gods themselves. The appearance of a trusted goddess as the advocate of human research helps Parmenides cope with the tricky problem that philosophical first principles cannor be proven by means of philosophy."

  53. Traglia, Antonio. 1955. "Per La Storia Dei Termini Onoma E Rhema E Sul Valore Di Onoma, Logos Ed Epos in Eraclito E in Parmenide." In Contributi Dell'istituto Di Storia Della Filosofia Dell'università Di Bari, 147-161. Trani: Vecchi & C. Editori.

  54. Tugendhat, Ernst. 1970. "Das Sein Und Das Nichts." In Durchblicke. Festschrift Für Martin Heidegger Zum 80. Geburstag, 132-161. Frankfurt: Klostermann.

    Reprinted in: E. Tugendhat - Philosophische Aufsätze - Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1992 pp. 36-66.

  55. Untersteiner, Mario. 1955. "L'essere Di Parmenide È Oúlon Non Hen." Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia no. 10:5-23.

    Reprinted as first chapter of: M. Untersteiner - Parmenide. Testimonianze e frammenti - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1958.

  56. Verdenius, Willem Jacob. 1942. Parmenides. Some Comments on His Poem. Groningen: J. B. Wolters.

    Reprinted wit a new Preface: Amsterdam, A. M. Hakkert, 1964.

    Contents: Preface (to the reprint) III-IV; Introduction 1; Chapter I. The doctrine of knowing 5; Chapter II. The doctrine of being 31; Chapter I. The doctrine of opinion 45; Appendices 64; Bibliography 79; English index 81; Greek index 82; Index of quotations 83-88.

    "Expounding an ancient philosophy is only possible with the aid of modern notions, which have a more limited sense than the material to which they are to be applied. Hence the difficulty of ascertaining the differences between ancient and modern abstractions and the danger of misconceiving an idea through attaching a too specific meaning to one or other particular expression. It will now be understood how in the course of time Parmenides has come to be classed with the most divergent philosophical systems. An attempt might be made to classify and analyse all these various interpretations. This would, however, not be the most expedient way to arrive at the real meaning of the poem. It stands to reason that our conclusions should be constantly reviewed and tested in the light of current opinion, but the more our considerations are bound up with the criticism of other interpreters, the greater will be the difficulty in evolving a coherent system of interpretation.

    So I will attempt to follow a more positive method by considering in detail three fundamental problems of Parmenides' philosophy, viz. 'Knowing', 'Being', and 'Opinion'. If it proves to be possible to arrive at definite conclusions in this respect, the road will probably be clear for a better understanding of the thoughts associated with these principles.

    With regard to the method adopted in my interpretation I may conclude with the following remark. I have pointed out already that Parmenides stands out from his predecessors by the application of a deductive method and the building up of a coherent argument. The methodical way of reasoning characterizes his work so much that even in ancient times he was classed by some critics among the dialecticians. In fact, his syllogisms, the distinction made between the three 'ways of inquiring', and also his way of putting questions foreshadow dialectical methods. This is not surprising since the whole trend of his thought aims at valid arguments, cogent conclusions, and complete evidence'. It seems advisable, then, to give more attention to the logical form in which Parmenides exposes his views than has been done hitherto. When the goddess of Truth counsels him not to trust to the senses but to judge by reasoning, we might accept her words as a suggestion to base our interpretation on the logical context of the argument in accordance with Parmenides' own intention.

    It may be objected that a criterium for such a logical context is hard to find since in a pre-Aristotelian philosopher we cannot expect a method of reasoning which may be formulated in syllogisms. From the logical point of view Parmenides' argument undeniably does not always comply with scientific standards, but this does not imply that the form of the syllogism is not applicable to his thought. This form is not an invention of Aristotle kept alive by convention, but it is at the root of all reasoning. Parmenides may not have been aware of the syllogistic form as a general mode of arguing, but he uses it, it may be unconsciously and not always accurately, yet, generally speaking, 'guided by truth itself'.

    I have undertaken the following inquiries in the belief that such a 'truth' exists, and that the principles of logic are no mere arbitrary grammatical phenomena as moderns would have us believe, but the universal foundation which underlies all science, including the science of interpretation." pp. 3-4 (notes omitted).

  57. ———. 1962. "Parmenides B2, 3." Mnemosyne no. 15:237.

    The subject of éstin is alethéia, considered not as a category of logic, but as the true nature of things.

  58. ———. 1966. "Der Logosbegriff Bei Heraklit Und Parmenides [First Part]." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 11:81-98.

  59. ———. 1967. "Der Logosbegriff Bei Heraklit Und Parmenides [Second Part]." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 12:99-117.

  60. Vick, George R. 1971. "Heidegger's Linguistic Rehabilitation of Parmenides' 'Being'." American Philosophical Quarterly no. 8:139-150.

    Reprinted in: Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978 pp. 204-221.

    "The strategy of Heidegger's complex semantic and etymological arguments for the meaningfulness of the word 'being' is unknown to the great majority of philosophers in Britain and America - and indeed, virtually unnoted even within the Phenomenological-Existential School. Also, the fact that he has corrected what is ordinarily taken to be an essential part of Parmenides' theory of being has not been pointed out (even by Heidegger). Nor has anyone noted the way in which Heidegger's correction makes Parmenides' theory more defensible. In this essay, Heidegger's strategy is set forth and explained; his defenses are related to the Hegelian, empiricist, and Eussellian attacks on 'Being'; and the way in which his correction of Parmenides' theory strengthens its claim to being true, is shown."

  61. Villani, Arnaud. 1988. "La Tenue Ontologique Dans Le Poème De Parménide." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 93:291-315.

  62. Viola, Coloman. 1984. "Á Propos D'un Fragment Du Poème De Parménide Cité Par Clément D'alexandrie (V Stromate C. Ix, 59, 6)." Bulletin de la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale no. 26:90-92.

    "Les Fragmente der Vorsokratiker Griechisch und Deutsch édités par H. Diels (réédités en 1934 par W. Franz) omettent une référence incluse dans le V Stromate de Clément d'Alexandrie (écrivant entre 193 et 211) concernant un fragment du Poème de Parménide. Cette référence, que rapportera Simplicius quatre siècles plus tard, comporte des variantes importantes par rapport au texte transmis par Simplicius."

  63. ———. 1987. "Aux Origines De La Gnoséologie: Réflexion Sur Le Sens Dur Fr. Iv Du Poème De Parménide." In Études Sur Parménide. Tome Ii. Problèmes D'interprétation, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 69-101. Paris: Vrin.

    "Le fr. IV du Poème de Parménide est sans aucun doute un des fragments les plus difficiles à interpréter: certains commentateurs sont allés jusqu'à mettre en doute son intelligibilité. (...)

    La solution ne consistera pas nécessairement en une option pure et simple pour l'une des hypothèses en excluant d'une manière absolue l'autre. Les difficultés du fragment ont amené certains à proposer des corrections du texte en supposant soit que Clément d'Alexandrie s'était trompé en le transcrivant soit que le texte de Clément lui-même nous est parvenu sous une forme corrompue. Ces problèmes grammaticaux et textuels difficiles à résoudre doivent inspirer une grande prudence en ce qui concerne l'interprétation du fragment. Ces difficultés combinées aux difficultés d'une méthodologie en général - dont un Hölscher (2) a déjà fait état -- mettent à une sérieuse épreuve quiconque se promettrait de trouver la solution idéale du fragment.

    Les cadres de cet essai ne rendent pas possible l'examen même superficiel de tous les problèmes qui ont été déjà soulevés au sujet de ce fragment. Je propose avant tout d'examiner le contexte originel dans les Stromates de Clément d'Alexandrie qui nous ont conservé le fragment pour y chercher et trouver éventuellement la solution de certains problèmes inhérents au fragment. D'autre part, pour éclaircir davantage le sens des termes, nous allons faire appel à la philologie comparée ce qui nous permettra d'esquisser quelques principes d'interprétation qui, à notre avis, devraient guider toute recherche concernant le sens du fragment." pp. 69-70 (notes omises)

    (2) Cf. U. Hölscher, Anfângliches Fragen. Studien zur frühen griechischen Philosophie, Göttingen, p.90.

  64. Vlastos, Gregory. 1946. "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 77:66-77.

    Reprinted in: G. Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy, Volume I: The Presocratics, Edited by Daniel W. Graham, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 153-163.

    "Parmenides' frag. 16 has been taken for a general statement of his theory of knowledge. I argue that it is no more than his doctrine of sense-perception, since it views thought as a passive record of the "much-wandering" ratio of light to darkness in the frame. Theophrastus' report that Parmenides explains "better and purer" thinking by the preponderance of light must refer to the active phases of thought, memory and judgment. When these are perfect the ratio of light to darkness must be one to zero, and the knowledge of Being must represent a state of unmixed light." p. 66

  65. White, Harvey. 2005. What Is What-Is? A Study of Parmenides' Poem. New York: Peter Lang.

  66. Wiesner, Jürgen. 1970. "Die Negation Der Entstehung Des Seienden. Studien Zu Parmenides B 8,5 - 21." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 52:1-34.

  67. ———. 1987. "Überlegungen Zu Parmenides, Fr. Viii, 34." In Études Sur Parménide. Tome Ii. Problèmes D'interprétation, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 170-191. Paris: Vrin.

    "Sur le lien dans le Fr. 8 entre " nous " et " eon", les raisons pour lesquelles l'être est accessible à la cognition."

  68. ———. 1996. Parmenides. Der Beginn Der Aletheia. Untersuchungen Zu B2 - B3 - B6. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort V-VI; Einleitung 1; 1, Kapitel: Antithesen 4; 2. Kapitel: Argumentation 84; Text und Übersetzung B2 - 8,2 251; Bibliographie 255; Indizes 262-280

  69. Wilkinson, Lisa Atwood. 2009. Parmenides and to Eon. Reconsidering Muthos and Logos. London: Continuum.

  70. Woodbury, Leonard. 1958. "Parmenides on Names." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology:145-160.

    Reprinted in: J. P. Anton and George L. Kustas (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek philosophy (Volume One), Albany, State University of New York Press, 1972, pp. 145-162 and in: C. Brown, R. Fowler, E. I. Robbins, P. M. Matheson Wallace (eds.), Collected Writings of Leonard E. Woodbury, Atlanta, Scholars Press, pp. 80-95.

  71. ———. 1986. "Parmenides on Naming by Mortal Men: Fr. B8:53-56." Ancient Philosophy no. 6:1-13.

    Reprinted in: C. Brown, R. Fowler, E. I. Robbins, P. M. Matheson Wallace (eds.), Collected Writings of Leonard E. Woodbury, Atlanta, Scholars Press, pp. 439-453.

  72. Wyatt, William F.Jr. 1992. "The Root of Parmenides." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology no. 94:113-120.

  73. Young, Tyler. 2006. "Perceiving Parmenides: A Reading of Parmenides of Elea's Philosophy by Way of the Proem." Dionysius no. 24:21-44.

    "Parmenides' poem must be read as a whole, beginning with the proem and seeing it as a basis for approaching the entirety of the work. Analysis of Homer's Odyssey and Hesiod's Theogony shows that Parmenides' poem is a masterpiece of allusion, and that the proem establishes a method and imagery by which the following two sections can be read both independently and in relation to each other. Examination of the Way of Doxa in the second part of the poem provides the opportunity for an explication of Parmenides' cosmology and theology and demonstrates that the Doxa is necessary to his philosophy. The heart of his thesis lies in the juxtaposition of the two ways. The Way of Truth in the third part stands as a succinct statement of the nature of Reality and its relation to human experience."

  74. Zafiropulo, Jean. 1950. L'école Eléate. Parménide, Zénon, Melissos. Paris: Belles Lettres.

  75. Zeller, Eduard. 1881. A History of Greek Philosophy from the Earliest Period to the Time of Socrates. London: Longman, Green and Co.

    With a General Introduction (pp. 1-183),

    Translated by S. F. Alleyne in two volumes from the German fourth edition of: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig: R. Reisland, 1876-1882.

    On Parmenides see: vol. I, pp. 580-608.

  76. Zeller, Eduard, and Mondolfo, Rodolfo. 1967. La Filosofia Dei Greci Nel Suo Sviluppo Storico. Parte I. I Presocratici. Volume Iii. Eleati. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

    Updated partial translation of E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, (Fifth Edition, 1892).

    The chapter on Parmenides (pp. 165-335) contains a thorough examination by Giovanni Reale of the critical literature up to 1965.

    Reprint of the volume with the title: Gli Eleati, Milano, Bompiani, 2011 with an updated bibliography (1965-2010) by Giuseppe Girgenti (pp. 481-539).

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