Algra, Keimpe. 1995. Concepts of Space in Greek Thought. Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Abbreviations IX; Introduction 1; 1. Writing the history of the concept of space 7; 2. Topos, Chôra, Kenon: some case studies 31; 3. Concepts of space in Plato's
Timaeus 72; 4. Conceptions of Topos in Aristotle 121; 5. Problems in Aristotle's theory of place and early Peripatetic reactions 192; 6. Place, space and void in Stoic thought 261;
Conclusions 335; Appeind: The Stoic theory of space and Aristotelian physics 336; Bibliography 341; Indices 351-363
Aubenque, Pierre. 1991. "Une Occasion Manquée: La Genèse Avortée De La Distinction Entre L'"Étant" Et Le "Quelque Chose"." In Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon, edited by
Aubenque, Pierre, 365-385. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Barnes, Jonathan, and Mignucci, Mario, eds. 1988. Matter and Metaphysics. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Proceedings of the fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, held in Pontignano, Italy, August 21-28, 1986.
Contents: Richard Sorabji: The Lays of Ancient Tuscany 9; Gabriele Giannantoni: Introduzione 11; Jacques Brunschwig: La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie
platonicienne 19; Mario Mignucci: The Stoic notion of relatives 129; Jonathan Barnes: Bits and pieces 223; David Sedley: Epicurean anti-reductionism 295; Malcolm Schofield: The retrenchable present
329; Nicholas Denyer: Stoicism and token reflexivity 375; Anna Maria Ioppolo: Le cause antecedenti in Cicero De fato 40 397; Fernanda Decleva Caizzi: La "materia scorrevole". Sulle tracce di
un dibattito perduto 425; Michael Wolff: Hipparchus and the Stoic theory of motion 471; Index locorum 549; Index of names 573; Index of subjects 581; Index of Greek and Latin terms 591-596.
Bobzien, Susanne. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
See Chapter 3 Modality, determinism, and freedom pp. 97-143.
"A considerable number of our testimonies about the Stoic doctrine of determinism are concerned with modality. In particular the concepts of possibility and necessity were central
to some parts of its discussion. It seems that Hellenistic philosophers generally agreed that an action or, in general, activity does not depend on us and is not in our power, if it (or a
corresponding proposition) is necessary or impossible; or, put differently, that a prerequisite for something's depending on us is that it is both possible and non-necessary. This fact is invoked
both by the Stoics in defence of their theory and in the criticism of their opponents. But in the debate over fate and determinism, modalities played a role in a number of different contexts. They
are dealt with separately in the following sections:
- Chrysippus rejected Diodorus' modal theory, because of its built-in necessitarian consequences (3.1.2).
- Chrysippus developed his own set of modal notions, which, in themselves, do not lead to necessitarianism and which secure a necessary condition for that which depends on us
- Some critics of Chrysippus and the Stoics developed arguments to show that there is a conflict between Chrysippus' modal notions and the Stoic theory of fate (3.2).
- Some later Stoics replied to this type of objection by giving an epistemic interpretation of Chrysippus' modal notions (3.3).
- Critics of the Stoics objected that fate, qua Necessity, renders all events necessary; but this objection is not justified in Chrysippus' philosophy (3.4)." p. 97
———. 2005. "Early Stoic Determinism." Revue de Mètaphysique et de Morale:489-516.
"Although from the 2nd century BC to the 3rd AD the problems of determinism were discussed almost exclusively under the heading of fate, early Stoic determinism, as introduced by
Zeno and elaborated by Chrysippus, was developed largely in Stoic writings on physics, independently of any specific theory of fate". Stoic determinism was firmly grounded in Stoic cosmology, and the
Stoic notions of causes, as corporeal and responsible for both sustenance and change, and of effects as incorporeal and as predicates, are indispensable for a full understanding of the theory. Stoic
determinism was originally not presented as causal determinism, but with a strong teleological element, in the context of a theory of natural motions, which makes use of a distinction between a
global and an inner-worldly perspective on events. However, Chrysippus also employed his conception of causality in order to explicate his determinism, and can be shown to have maintained a universal
causal determinism in the modern sense of the term. The teleological and mechanical elements of early Stoic determinism were brought together in Chrysippus' conception of fate, which places elements
of rationality in every cause."
Boeri, Marcelo. 2001. "The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals." Review of Metaphysics no. 54:723-752.
Bréhier, Émile. 1908. La Théorie Des Incorporels Dans L'ancien Stoïcisme. Paris: Vrin.
Neuvième édition 1997.
Bronowski, Ada. 2007. "The Stoic View on Universals." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 18:71-87.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1988. "La Théorie Stoïcienne Du Genre Suprême Et L'ontologie Platonicienne." In Matter and Metaphysics. Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by
Jonathan, Barnes and Mignucci, Mario, 19-127. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Repris dans: J. Brunschwig, Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques: Epicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.
Translated in English by Janet Lloyd as: The Stoic theory of the supreme genus and platonic ontology, in: J. Brunschwig, Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy,
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 92-157.
———. 1990. "Sur Une Façon Stoïcienne De Ne Pas Être." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no. 122:389-403.
Repris dans: J. Brunschwig, Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques: Epicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.
Translated in English by Janet Lloyd as: On a Stoic Way of Not Being, in: J. Brunschwig, Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,
1994, pp. 158-169.
———. 1997. "Les Stoiciens." In Philosophie Grecque, edited by Canto-Sperber, Monique, 511-562. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
———. 2003. "Stoic Metaphysics." In The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, edited by Inwood, Brad, 206-232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Caston, Victor. 1999. "Something and Nothing: The Stoics on Concepts and Universals." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 17:145-213.
Christiansen, Johnny. 1962. An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
Second edition with a Foreword and Afterword by Sten Ebbesen and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2013.
Couloubaritsis, Lambros. 2005. "Les Structure Hénologiques Dans Le Stoïcisme Ancien." In Les Stoïciens, edited by Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert and Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste,
187-211. Paris: Vrin.
Courtine, Jean-François. 1980. "Note Complémentaire Pour L'histoire Du Vocabulaire De L'être. Les Traductions Latines D' Ousía Et La Compréhension Romano-Stoïcienne De
L'être." In Concepts Et Catégories De La Pensée Antique, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 33-87. Paris: Vrin.
Reprinted and updated in: J-F. Courtine, Les catégories de l'être. Études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale, Paris, Press Universitaires de France, 2003, pp. 11-77.
Crivelli, Paolo. 2007. "The Stoics on Definitions and Universals." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 18:89-122.
de Harven, Vanessa. 2012. The Coherence of Stoic Ontology, University of Calfornia, Berkeley.
Unpublished Ph.D dissertation available at ProQuest Dissertations and Thesis.
Drozdek, Adam. 2002. "Lekton. Stoic Logic and Ontology." Acta antiqua.Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae no. 42:93-104.
"For the Stoics, the lekton is as an intermediary between the thought and the object. They do not exist independently of the mind, but, at the same time, the mind does not
create them. Due to this status, they guarantee intersubjectivity of the rational discourse. They are incorporeals that do not exist, but subsist and the Stoic Logos-God guarantees their permanent
subsistence. The lekta are semantico-syntactic entities. Their role is analogous to the role of an interlingua used as a tool for automated translation of languages."
Epp, Ronald H., ed. 1985. Recovering the Stoics. Memphis: Memphis University Press.
Spindel Conference 1984 published in the Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary volume 23.
Contents: Ronald H. Epp: Editor's Introduction; John M. Rist: Stoicism: some reflections on the state of the art 1; Anthony A. Long: The Stoics on world-conflagration and
everlasting recurrence 13; David E. Hahm: The Stoic theory of change 39: Nicholas P. White: The role of physics in Stoic ethics 57; Brad Inwood: The Stoics on the grammar of action 75; Davide Sedley:
The Stoic theory of universals 87; Peter Barker: Jean Pena and Stoic physics in the 16th century 93; B. J. T. Dobbs: Newton and Stoicism 109; Ronald H. Epp: Stocism bibliography 125-171.
Eunyoung Ju, Anna. 2009. "Th E Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 54:371-389.
Goldschmidt, Victor. 1953. Les Système Stoicien Et L'idée De Temps. Paris: Vrin.
Deuxième édition 1969; troisième édition 1977; quatrième édition 1979.
———. 1972. " Hyparxein Et Hyphistanai Dans La Philosophie Stoicienne." Revue des Études Grecques:331-345.
Repris dans: V. Goldschmidt, Écrits. Tome 1: Études de philosophie ancienne, Paris, Vrin, 1984, pp. 187-201.
Goulet, Richard. 2005. "Les Principes Stoïciens Sont'ils Des Corps Ou Sont-Ils Incorporels?" In Agonistes. Essays in Honour of Denis O'brien, edited by Dillon, John and
Dixsaut, Monique, 157-176. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 2005. "La Disparition Et La Reconstitution Du Stoïcisme: Éléments Pour Une Histoire." In Les Stoiciens, edited by Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert and
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, 13-28. Paris: Vrin.
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, and Barnes, Jonathan, eds. 2009. Lire Les Stoïciens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Table des matières: Avant-propos 1; Abréviations 3; Jonathan Barnes et Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Introduction 5; Première partie: L'école stoïcienne à l'époque hellénistique. I.
Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Épistémologie, rhétorique et grammaire 23; II. Paolo Crivelli: La dialectique 41; III. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Le monde 63; IV. David Sedley: Les dieux et les hommes 79; V.
Thomas Bénatouil: La vertu, le bonheur et la nature 99; VI. Suzanne Husson: Le convenable, les passions, le sage et la cité 115; Seconde partie: Le stoïcisme impérial. VII. Jonathan Barnes:
Grammaire, rhétorique, épistémologie et dialectique 135; VIII. Keimpe Algra: Cosmologie et théologie 151; IX. Anthony A. Long: L'éthique: continuité et innovations 171; X. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: La
sagesse et les exercices philosophiques 193; XI. Christelle Veillard: L'empreinte du stoïcisme sur la politique romaine 201; Chronologie 211; Bibliographie 215; Index des passages cités 225-234
Graeser, Andreas. 1971. "A Propos Hyparchein Be Den Stoikern." Archiv für Bregiffsgeschichte no. 15:299-305.
———. 1972. Plotinus and the Stoics. A Preliminary Study. Leiden: Brill.
Hadot, Pierre. 1969. "Zur Vorgeschichte Des Begriffs 'Existenz'. Hyparchein Bei Den Stoikern." Archiv für Bregiffsgeschichte no. 13:115-127.
"Das Wort exsistentia erscheint erstmalig im Lateinischen-in den theologischen Werken des Marius Victorinus, in denen es fast immer zur Übersetzung von hyparxis; dient, im Gegensatz
zu dem Wort substantia das ousia übersetzt, und zu subsistentia, das hypostasis wiedergibt. (1) Exsistentia ist abgeleitet von exsistere, das in der philosophischen Sprache oft für esse eintrat,
zumal in der Form des Partizips.(2) Exsistere seinerseits wurde auch zur Übersetzung von hyparkein verwendet, wie aus der Timaios-Übersetzung des Calcidius ersichtlich.(3)
Für das Verständnis der Vorgeschichte des Begriffes Existenz ist es daher unerläßlich, sorgfältig die Bedeutung zu präzisieren, die das Wort hyparkein innerhalb des technischen
Wortschatzes der griechischen Philosophie aufweist, und die vorliegende Studie möchte einen Beitrag zu einer derartigen Untersuchung liefern. Zunächst soll zu zeigen versucht werden, daß das Wort
hyparkein innerhalb der Stoa eine Seinsweise bezeichnet, die dem Geschehen, dem Akzidenz, dem Prädikat zukommt und der Seinsweise des Subjektes gegenübergestellt wird. Danach soll diese Bedeutung des
hyparkein einerseits mit dem aristotelischen, andererseits mit dem neuplatonischen, Gebrauch dieses Wortes verglichen werden." p. 115
(1) Marius Victorinus Adversus Arium, III, 7, 9, Henry-Hadot (Sources Chrétiennes, Paris, 1960); deutsche Übersetzung, Bibliothek der alten Welt, Artemis Verlag, S. 244-245,
Hadot-Brenke); Adversus Arium, II, 4, 48-57 (S. 221, Hadot-Brenke); Candidi Arriani (= Marii Victorini) ad Marium Victorinum rhetorem, I, 2, 18 (S. 74, Hadot-Brenke).
(2) CICERO, De officiis, I, 30, 107: "Ut in corporibus magnae diaim;litudines suns, sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam uarietates " Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arium, I, 33, 7:
"In potentia exsistens ad id quod est esse."
(3) Calcidius, Timaeus, 50, 23, Wasznik: "In reputatione quidem et consideratlone, uere existentis uereque peruigilis naturae." Cf. Plato, Tim. 52 B.
———. 1991. "Philosophie, Discours Philosophiques Et Divisions De La Philosophie Chez Les Stoiciens." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 45:205-219.
Hahm, David E. 1977. The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Contents: Preface IX; Abbreviations XI; Introduction XIII-XIX; I. Corporealism 3; II. Principles 29; III. Cosmogony 57; IV. Cosmology 91; V. Cosmobiology 136; VI. The Cosmic Cycle
185; VII. Epilogue: The definition of Nature and the origins of Stoic cosmology 200; Appendixes. I. Influences on Stoicism according to the biographical tradition 219; II. The contents of Book One of
Chrysippus's Physics 238; III. Cleanthes' Cosmogony 240; IV. Accounts of the Stoic proofs for the immobility and coherence of the Cosmos 249; V. Chrysippus's statement on the alleged
imperishability of the Cosmos 260; VI. Cleanthes' proof for the intelligence of the Cosmos 267; Indexes 275-292.
———. 1992. "Diogenes Laertius Vii: On the Stoics." In Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Vol. 36: Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. 6. Teilband: Philosophie
(Doxographica [Forts.]), edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 4076-4182. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Indices pp. 4404-4411.
"In this study I propose to reexamine Diogenes' composition of the seventh book of his 'Lives' in the light of what is now known about ancient methods of composition of
informational works. By carefully picking through the text for evidence on its construction I hope to clarify the nature and identity of most of the sources that he used in this book. This analysis
will also bring into clearer focus his historiographical and literary objectives to the extent that they are manifested in this book. It is my hope that these results will, in combination with
studies of other parts of his work, also advance our understanding and appreciation of Diogenes as an author and historian of philosophy in the early third century A. D."
Ierodiakonou, Katerina. 1993. "The Stoic Division of Philosophy." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 38:57-74.
"In introductions to Stoicism, Stoic philosophy customarily is discussed under the headings of "logic", "physics", and "ethics"; the evidence, however, shows that the Stoics' own
view on the tripartition was more complex. The paper focusses on a passage in Diogenes Laertius (VII 39-41) and deals with the following four points the passage raises: first, according to most
Stoics, it is not philosophy, but philosophical discourse, which is divided into three parts. Second, different Stoics used different terms when referring to the three parts. Third, Stoics were not
unanimous as to the order of the three parts. Fourth, different similes were used by the Stoics to describe the interrelation of the three parts. It is only by close analysis of these points that we
see in what sense Stoic philosophers divided philosophy, and how they understood the unity of the philosophical disciplines underlying their division."
———, ed. 1999. Topics in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Contents: List of Contributors VIII; Katerina Ieorodiakonou: Introduction. The study of Stoicism: its defense and revival 1; 1. Jonathan Barnes: Aristotle and Stoic logic 23; 2.
Mario Mignucci: The Liar Paradox and the Stoics 54; Michael Frede: On the Stoic conception of the Good 71; 4. Brad Inwood: Rules and reasoning in Stoic ethics 95; 5. David Sedley: The Stoic-Platonist
debate on kathékonta 128; 6. Philip Mitsis: The Stoic origin of natural rights 153; 7. Dirk Obbink: The Stoic sage in the cosmic city 178; 8. Susanne Bobzien: Chrysippus' theory of causes
196; Select bibliography 243; Index locorum 249; Index of names 255-259
Ildefonse, Frédérique. 2004. Les Stoïciens I. Zénon, Cléanthe, Chrysippe. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Sommaire: Reperès chronologiques 9; Introduction 11; i. Physique 31; II. Logique, 1: Théories de la représentation 75; III. Logique, 2: La syntaxe des lexta 111; IV.
Éthique 143; V. La théorie du destin 183; Conclusion 211; Bibliographie 219-224
Inwood, Brad. 1999. "Stoicism." In Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume Ii: From Aristotle to Augustine, edited by Furley, David, 222-252. New York: Routledge.
———, ed. 2003. The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Contributors VII-IX; Brad Inwood: Introduction: Stoicism, an intellectual Odyssey 1; 1. David Sedley: The School from Zeno to Arius Didymus 7; 2. Christopher Gill: The
School in the Roman Imperial period 33; 3. R. Jim Hankinson: Stoic epistemology 59; 4. Susanne Bobzien: Logic 85; Michael J. White: Stoic natural philosophy (physics and cosmology) 124; 6. Keimpe
Algra: Stoic theology 153; 7. Dorothea Frede: Stoic determinism 179; 8. Jacques Brunschwig: Stoic metaphysics 206; 9. Malcolm Schofield: Stoic ethics 233; 10. Tad Brennan: Stoic moral psychology 257;
11. R. Jim Hankinson: Stoicism and medicine 395; 12. David Blank and Catherine Atherton: The Stoic contribution to traditional grammar 310; 13. The Stoics and the astronomical sciences 328; 14.
Terence H. Irwin: Stoic naturalism and his critics 345; 15. Anthony A. Long: Stoicism in the philosophical tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler 365; Bibliography 393; List of primary works 417;
General index 423; Passages index 433-438.
Irwin, Terence H. 1997. "Aristotelian Substances and Stoic Subjects." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 51:397-415.
Isnardi-Parente, Margherita. 2005. "La Notion D'incorporel Chez Les Stoiciens." In Les Stoïciens, edited by Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert and Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, 175-185.
Layrand, Valéry. 2002. Le Vocabulaire Des Stoiciens. Paris: Ellipses Marketing.
Réédition in Jean Pierre Zarader (ed.), Le vocabulaire des philosophes, Vol. I. De l'Antiquité à la Renaissance, Paris, Ellipses, 2002, pp. 219-268
Lewis, Eric. 1995. "The Stoics on Identity and Individuation." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 40:89-108.
Lloyd, Anthony C. 1970. "Activity and Description in Aristotle and the Stoa." Proceedings of the British Academy no. 56:227-240.
———. 1971. "Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa." In Problems in Stoicism, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 58-74. London: Athlone Press.
"The Stoics thought language to be natural and not conventional, but they failed to separate the theory of meaning from the theory of etymology. Aristotle's categories underlay his
logic and metaphysics, which belonged to a doctrine of terms. The Stoic categories, however, depended upon traditional grammar."
Long, Anthony Arthur, ed. 1971. Problems in Stoicism. London: Athlone Press.
Contents: Preface to Reprint (1996) VI; Preface VIII; Corrigenda X; Anthony A. Long: Introduction 1; I. Francis H. Sandbach: Phantasia Kataleptike 9; II. Francis H.
Sandbach: Ennoia and Prolépsis 22; III. John M. Rist: Categories and their uses 38; IV. Arthur C. Lloyd: Grammar and metaphysics in the Stoa 58; V. Anthony A. Long: Language and
thought in Stoicism 75; VI. E. G. Pembroke Oikeiosis 114; VII. Ian G. Kidd: Stoic intermediates and the end for man 150; VIII. Anthony A. Long: Freedom and determinism in the Stoic theory of
human action 173; IX. Ian G. Kidd: Posidonius on emotions 200; X. Gerard Watson: The natural law and Stoicism 216; Select bibliography 239; Indexes 242-257.
"This book brings together a set of papers by different hands on problems in Stoicism. Most of the material is published here for the first time, and it deals with problems of Stoic
epistemology, logic, metaphysics and ethics. In more than one sense this book is a statement of work in progress. Several of its topics take up questions already treated in recent literature, and
further publications on Stoicism by most of its authors are current or forthcoming. More particularly, half the chapters of the book were presented at a series of seminars in the Institute of
Classical Studies, University of London, and we are deeply grateful to its Director, Professor E. W. Handley, for offering us such a congenial forum for discussion and for suggesting publication in
The problems in Stoicism are vast, and they vary greatly in type over a long period of time. This book makes no claim to treat more than some of them, much less to give a
comprehensive account of Stoicism. But its collection of papers does cover topics of considerable philosophical and historical importance, and through the treatment of these much of the coherence and
significance of Stoicism as a whole can be seen. Because we are concerned here with a school of Greek philosophy, and its Roman inheritance, part, sometimes a large part, of the discussion turns on
matters of philology. But with the help of translation and transliteration it is hoped that the book will be found intelligible and interesting to those who have no knowledge of Greek and Latin. A
short bibliography gives full details of most of the works on Stoicism cited in the notes and often referred to there by abbreviated titles." (From the Preface)
———. 1974. Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Second edition 1986 with a Bibliographical Postscript 1985 pp. 257-268.
See Chapter 4: Stoicism § III: Stoic logic pp. 121-146.
Lossky, Nikolay. 1929. "The Metaphysics of the Stoics." Journal of Philosophical Studies no. 4:481-489.
"The metaphysical doctrine of the Stoics is a remarkable instance of a theory that appears to be materialism, but is in truth a form of unconscious ideal-realism. It is worth while
to give an exposition of it in order to show that this is really the case, and, incidentally, to explain why a materialistic philosophy seems so attractive to many minds. I will refer chiefly to the
teaching of the ancient Stoics, i.e. of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, and also to the later doctrine of Posidonius."
Mansfeld, Jaap. 1986. "Diogenes Laertius on Stoic Philosophy." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 7:295-382.
Mansfeld, Jaap. 2003. "Zeno on the Unity of Philosophy." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 48:116-131.
Papazian, Michael. 1999. "Stoic Ontology and the Reality of Time." Ancient Philosophy no. 19:105-119.
"Aristotle starts his discussion of time in Physics iv by presenting a couple of paradoxical arguments that appear to show that time does not exist at all or that it exists only
'scarcely or dimly' (217b29).(1) The first paradox begins with the assertion that both infinite time and also any period of time are composed of a part that is past and a part that is future. The
past has been but is not now. The future will be but it is not yet. It follows that no part of time just is. Since nothing which consists entirely of non-existing parts can exist, time does not
One may argue on behalf of the reality of time that at least one part of time, namely the present, is. Aristotle replies that the present or the 'now' is not a part. A whole must be
made up of parts, but the whole of time is not thought to be made up of 'nows'. Aristotle does not state exactly why the whole of time is not thought to be made up of nows. The argument may be that
if there is a present, it either has a duration or it does not. If it has duration or temporal extension, then it is not really present but consists of a part that is past and future (cf. 234a9-19).
But if it lacks extension, it cannot be a part of time because 'parts must measure, and the whole must be composed of parts' (218a6-7). A durationless point of time cannot be used to measure time nor
can the whole of time consist of durationless points.
Aristotle does not provide a refutation of the paradoxical arguments against the reality of time in his subsequent discussion. (2) The question of the reality of time remained an
issue in Hellenistic philosophy and, in particular, for the Stoics. The purpose of this article is to examine the Stoic ontology of time. Did the Stoics believe that time is real? How did they
understand the relation between the past, present, and future? These are important questions not only because Stoic views on time are interesting in their own right but also because they can shed
much needed light on the philosophy of time in late antiquity. The Stoic views appear to have had considerable influence on late Neoplatonic theories of time and on Augustine's speculations on
(1) Translations of the Physics are from Hussey Aristotle Physics Books III and IV Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983.
(2) Most commentators, though, claim that Aristotle's discussion of time provides the requisite philosophical apparatus to refute the arguments. See, e.k., Sorabji Time, Creation
and the Continuum, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983, 7ff.
Pohlenz, Max. 1948. Die Stoa. Geschichte Einer Geistigen Bewegung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Two volumes: I (1948), II (1949).
See: Vol. I - Die Logik. Der Logos als Träger unserer geistigen Existenz pp. 37-62.
Traduzione italiana: La Stoa. Storia di un movimento spirituale - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1967.
Rieth, Otto. 1933. Grundbegriffe Der Stoischen Ethik. Eine Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.
Rist, John M. 1969. Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———, ed. 1978. The Stoics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations VIII; 1. Ian Mueller: An introduction to Stoic logic 1; Michael Frede: Principles of Stoic grammar 27; Andreas Graeser: The Stoic theory of
meaning 77; Anthony A. Long: Dialectic and the Stoic sage 101; George B. Kerferd: What does the wise man know? 125; 6. Robert B. Todd: Monism and immanence: the foundations of Stoic physics 137;
Michael Lapidge: Stoic cosmology 161; 8. Margaret E. Reesor: Necessity and fate in Stoic philosophy 187; 9. Charlotte Stough: Stoic determinism and moral responsibility 203; 10. Arthur C. Lloyd:
Emotion and decision in Stoic psychology 233; 11. Ian G. Kidd: Moral actions and rules in Stoic Ethics 247; 12. John M. Rist: The Stoic concept of detachment 259; 13. F. E. Sparshott: Zeno on art:
anatomy of a definition 273; Bibliography 291-295.
Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert, and Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, eds. 2005. Les Stoïciens. Paris: Vrin.
Table des matières: Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey: Préface 7; Note liminaire 11; Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: La disparition et la reconstitution du stoïcïsme : éléments pour une histoire 13;
Tiziano Dorandi: La tradition papyrologique des stoïciens 29; Première partie: Logique, poétique et théorie de la connaissance; Aldo B. Brancacci: Antisthène et le stoïcisme: la logique 55; David
Sedley: La définition stoïcienne de la phantasia katalêptiké 75; Richard Goulet: La méthode allégorique des stoïciens 93; Anna Maria Ioppolo: Poétique et théorie de la perception chez
Ariston 121; Stéphane Toulouse: Les sciences et l'âme chez Posidonius. Remarques sur une définition de l'âme conservée dans Plutarque et sur le statut de l'astronomie et des mathématiques dans sa
philosophie 153; Deuxième partie: La physique stoïcienne. La nature et les dieux; Margherita Isnardi-Parente: La notion d'incorporel chez les stoïciens 175; Lambros Couloubartsis: Les structures
hénologiques dans le stoïcisme ancien 187; Michael Frede: Sur la théologie stoïcienne 213; Clara Auvray-Assayas: Deux types d'exposé stoïcien sur la providence dans le De natura deorum de
Cicéron 233; Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Prédiction du futur et action humaines dans le traité de Chrysippe Sur Ie destin 247; Troisième partie: L'homme et l'éthique; Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey: La
naissance de la subjectivité chez les stoïciens 277; Maximilian Forschner: Le Portique et le concept de personne 293; Mary-Anne Zagdoun: Problèmes concernant l' oikeiôsis stoïcienne 319;
Cristina Viano: L'Epitomê de l'éthique stoïcienne d'Arius Didyme (Stobée, Eclog. II, 7, 57, 13-116, 18) 335; Jacques Brunschwig: Sur deux notions de l'éthique stoïcienne. De la "réserve" au
"renversement" 357; Maria Daraki: Les deux races d'hommes dans le stoïcisme d'Athènes 381; Anthony A. Long: L'empreinte socratique dans la philosophie d'Épictète 403; Ilsetraut Hadot et Pierre Hadot:
La parabole de l'escale dans le Manuel d'Épictète et son commentaire par Simplicius 427; Quatrième partie: Postérités du Stoïcisme ; Jean-Joël Duhot: Métamorphoses du logos. Du stoïcisme au
Nouveau Testament 453; Agnès Pigler: Les éléments stoïciens de la doctrine plotinienne de la connaissance ( Traité 29) 467; Philippe Hoffmann: La définition stoïcienne du temps dans le miroir
du néoplatonisme (Plotin, Jamblique) 487; Michel Gourinat: Hegel et le stoïcisme 523; Bibliographie d'orientation par Jean-Baptiste Gourinat 545; Index des textes cités 573; Index des noms anciens et
médiévaux 603; Index des noms modernes et contemporains 608; Index des notions 615-620.
Samb, Djibril. 2009. Étude Du Lexique Des Stoiciens. Paris: L'Harmattan.
Sambursky, Samuel. 1959. Physics of the Stoics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Reprint: Westport, Greenwood, 1973 and Routledge & Kegan Paul 1987.
Contents: Preface V; Introduction VII-X; I. The Dynamic Continuum 1; II. Pneuma and Force 21; III. The Sequence of Physical Events 49; IV. The Whole and Its Parts 81; Appendix:
Translations of Texts 116; Selected Bibliography 146; Index to Passages Quoted 148; General Index 151-153.
Sandbach, Francis Henry. 1985. Aristotle and the Stoics. Cambridge: The Cambridge Philological Society.
Contents: Preface IV, Abbreviations V; List of works cited VI-XI; I. Introduction 1; II. References to Aristotle 4; III. Methods of estimating influence 16; IV. Logic 18; V. Ethics
24; VI. Physics 31; VII: Disregard of peculairly Aristotelian ideas 53; VIII. Conclusion 55; Panaettius and Posidonius 58; Appendix: Ocellus Lucanus 63; Notes 65; Index 82-88.
"This essay maintains that the extent of influence exerted by Aristotle on the Stoics has often been exaggerated by modern scholars. A collection of all references to him by authors
other than Peripatetics, whether contemporary or belonging to the following century, shows that his importance as a philosopher was not then recognised and reveals a lack of evidence that his
school-works were known. Professor Sandbach argues that it is a mistake to proceed on the assumption that the Stoics must have known his work, or even an outline of it, and been stimulated whether to
agreement or to modification. If the supposed evidence for Aristotelian influence is examined without this presumption, much is found to be flimsy and some can be confidently rejected. A residue
remains of varying degrees of probability, which it is hard to estimate owing to our insufficient information, particularly about Zeno, about the Academy of his time, about Aristotle's exoteric
works, and about memory of him in oral tradition." (Abstract, p. 89)
Sedley, David. 1982. "The Stoic Criterion of Identity." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 27:255-275.
"The growing argument, a sceptical puzzle favoured by the Hellenistic Academy, maintained that every material reconstitution, however slight, entails a change of identity. The
Stoics responded to this challenge by denying the identity of a "qualified individual" with his material substrate. This was achieved in particular by Chrysippus' paradox about Dion and Theon
(ancient forerunners of Geach's Tibbles and Tib), Best interpreted as a dialectical refutation of the growing argument's assumption that matter is the sole principle of individuation. Chrysippus
thereby licensed his theory of the four levels of existence (conventionally called the Stoic theory of "categories"). The notion of enduring "qualified individual" provides a criterion of identity
central not only to this theory but also to a quite separate epistemological thesis, that of the possibility of infallible recognition."
———. 1985. "The Stoic Theory of Universals." In Recovering the Stoics, edited by Epp, Ronald H., 87-92. Memphis: Memphis University Press.
Supplementary volume to the Southern Journal of Philosophy.
———. 1999. "Stoics Physics and Metaphysics." In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra, Keimpe, Jonathan, Barnes, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield,
Malcolm, 382-411. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2008. "Stoic Metaphysics at Rome." In Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought. Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, edited by Salles, Ricardo, 117-142.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
In this essay my main concern has been to illustrate the Roman Stoics' attitude to metaphysics. It is an area of philosophical discourse in which Seneca grants the Platonists and
Aristotelians greater territorial rights than in any other. For his excursions into it he offers a fundamentally Platonist justification, and as regards ontological kinds, at least, he sees Platonism
as superior to the legacy of his own school.
What we have seen to be Seneca's reservations about Stoic metaphysics, I can now add, fit comfortably with Letter 117, where he finds severe ethical disadvantages in the Stoics' too
rigid distinction between corporeals and incorporeals, and Letter 113, where he is painfully embarrassed by the Stoic paradox which treats virtues as living beings. But its most typical manifestation
is in the counting games which Seneca and other Stoics play with their Platonic-Aristotelian colleagues. Sometimes the Stoics are the winners at these games-notably when arguing more directly against
Aristotle, the inventor and chief proponent of such games-sometimes, on Seneca's own confession, the losers. It is this residue of open-mindedness that most clearly characterizes the syncretism which
we have been witnessing.
Seneca's readiness to jump ship shows up with regard to metaphysical questions far more prominently and explicitly than in other philosophical areas.(59) I have tried to sketch in a
background which makes it plausible that, far from being Seneca's own quirk, this attitude was characteristic of Roman Stoicism in his day. It is hard to know whether it is anything more than
accidental that both the main figures who have emerged as Seneca's fellow-participants in the discussions-Severus and Cornutus have Roman names. But Cornutus at least, like Seneca himself, worked in
Italy; and Sergius Plautus has emerged as yet another Roman Stoic of the era who wrote about both Stoic and Aristotelian metaphysics. In the light of this pronounced pattern, I do not see why we
should not assume Italy to be the primary scene of those discussions, as indeed Seneca may be taken to imply when he presents them in narrative guise as recent conversations with his friends. My main
point, however, is that Seneca is almost certainly not alone among Stoics in his constructively conciliatory attitude to Platonist metaphysics.
If it had merely been a question of Seneca's personal distaste for abstruse areas of Stoic metaphysics, it would have been easy for him to remain silent, as lie does for the most
part about Stoic epistemology and logic. But instead of thus staying aloof, he cooperates in what I have presented as a pooling of resources between Stoic and Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics.(60)
If I have been even half right, his way of conducting these negotiations can teach us something about what it meant to be a Stoic in an age when the Platonic worldview was rapidly regaining its old
ascendancy.(61)" pp. 140-141
(59) Seneca's psychology is often taken to be infused with Platonic rational-irrational dualism. For a measured response to this assessment, see Brad Inwood, 'Seneca and
Psychological Dualism', in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum (eds.), Passions and Perceptions (Cambridge, 1993), 150-83. The Platonizing tendency in Letters 58 and 65 seems much stronger and
more explicit than that in any of the psychological cases discussed by Inwood.
(60) For evidence of the degree of syncretism that had developed by Plotinus' day, cf. Porphyry, Vit. Plot. 17.3, on Trypho 'the Stoic and Platonist'.
(61) Ancestors of this essay have benefited from discussion with audiences at Chicago, Gargnano (Italy), Mexico City, London, and Cambridge. My thanks to all who were kind enough to
supply comments, especially Brad Inwood, Victor Caston, Ricardo Salles, Stephen Menn, and Myles Burnyeat, although responsibility for the views expressed is entirely my own.
It is a special pleasure to be contributing, with this essay, to a collaborative celebration of Richard Sorabji and his work. No one has done more than he has to show the
philosophical vitality of the debates conducted in the Roman imperial era.
Sellars, John. 2010. "Stoic Ontology and Plato’s Sophist." In Aristotle and the Stoics Reading Plato, edited by Harte, Verity;, McCabe, Nary Margaret;, Sharples,
Robert W.; and Sheppard, Anne D. R., 185-203. London: Institute of Classical Studies.
See Chapter Three: Stoic Logic pp. 55-79.
Todd, Robert B. 1976. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics. Leiden: Brill.
A study of the De mixtione with prelimunary essays, text, translation and commentary.
White, Stephen. 2007. "Posidonius and Stoic Physics." In Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 Bc - 200 Ad. Vol. Ii, edited by Sharples, Robert W. and Sorabji, Richard, 35-76.
London: Institute of Classical Studies.